Agent based computational model of trust by Gorobets, A. (Alexander) & Nooteboom, B. (Bart)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ERIM REPORT SERIES RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
ERIM Report Series reference number ERS-2004-108-ORG 
Publication  December 2004 
Number of pages 12 
Email address corresponding author alex-gorobets@mail.ru 
Address Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) 
Rotterdam School of Management / Rotterdam School of Economics  
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
P.O.Box 1738  
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
Phone:  +31 10 408 1182   
Fax: +31 10 408 9640 
Email:  info@erim.eur.nl 
Internet:  www.erim.eur.nl 
 
Bibliographic data and classifications of all the ERIM reports are also available on the ERIM website:  
www.erim.eur.nl 
Agent based computational model of trust 
 
Alexander Gorobets and Bart Nooteboom 
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT 
 
REPORT SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA AND CLASSIFICATIONS 
Abstract This paper employs the methodology of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to 
investigate under what conditions trust can be viable in markets. The emergence and breakdown 
of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and suppliers. Agents adapt their trust in a 
partner, the weight they attach to trust relative to profitability, and their own trustworthiness, 
modeled as a threshold of defection. Adaptation occurs on the basis of realized profit. Trust turns 
out to be viable under fairly general conditions. 
Mission:  HF 5001-6182 
 Programme: HF 5546-5548.6, HF 5549-5549.5 
Library of Congress 
Classification  
(LCC) 
   LCC Webpage 
  Paper: HB846.3 Transaction costs 
Mission: M 
 Programme : M 10, L 2, M 12 
Journal of Economic 
Literature  
(JEL) 
 JEL Webpage 
  Paper: C 53 Forecasting and Other Model 
Applications 
L 14 Transactional Relationships 
Gemeenschappelijke Onderwerpsontsluiting (GOO) 
Mission: 85.00 
 Programme: 85.05, 85.08, 85.62 
Classification GOO 
  Paper: 31.80 Toepassingen van de wiskunde 
Mission: Bedrijfskunde / Bedrijfseconomie 
 Programme: Organisatieleer,  prestatiebeoordeling, personeelsbeleid 
Keywords GOO 
  Paper: transactiekosten, vertrouwen, wiskundige modellen 
Free keywords Agent-based computational economics, transaction costs, trust 
 
 
  
Agent based computational model of trust 
 
Alexander Gorobets and Bart Nooteboom 
 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
alex-gorobets@mail.ru, b.nooteboom@uvt.nl 
  
 
This paper employs the methodology of Agent-Based Computational Economics 
(ACE) to investigate under what conditions trust can be viable in markets. The 
emergence and breakdown of trust is modeled in a context of multiple buyers and 
suppliers. Agents adapt their trust in a partner, the weight they attach to trust 
relative to profitability, and their own trustworthiness, modeled as a threshold of 
defection. Adaptation occurs on the basis of realized profit. Trust turns out to be 
viable under fairly general conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The viability of trust between firms in markets is a much-debated issue (for a survey, 
see Nooteboom 2002). Economics, in particular transaction cost economics, doubts the 
viability of trust. Thus, refuting skepticism from TCE would make the strongest case for trust, 
and that is the project of this article. In this article we employ TCE logic, but we also deviate 
from TCE in two fundamental respects. 
First, while TCE assumes that optimal forms of organization will arise, yielding 
maximum efficiency, we consider that problematic. The making and breaking of relations 
between multiple agents with adaptive knowledge and preferences may yield complexities 
and path-dependencies that preclude the achievement of maximum efficiency.  
Second, while TCE assumes that reliable knowledge about loyalty or trustworthiness 
is impossible (Williamson 1975, 1993), so that opportunism must be assumed, we expect that 
under some conditions trust is feasible, by inference from observed behaviour, and that 
trustworthiness is viable, in yielding profit. To investigate this, the methodology of ACE 
enables us to take a process approach to trust (Gulati 1995, Zucker 1986, Zand 1972), by 
modeling the adaptation of trust and trustworthiness in the light of experience in interaction.  
The analysis is conducted in the context of transaction relations between multiple 
buyers and suppliers, where buyers have the option to make rather than buy, which is the 
classical setting for the analysis of transaction costs.  
We employ a model developed from an earlier model from Klos and Nooteboom 
(2001).  In this model, agents make and break transactions relations on the basis of 
preferences, based on trust and potential profit.  
The article proceeds as follows. First, further specification is given of technical details 
of the model. Next, we specify the experiments. The article closes with conclusions.    
  
2. The model 
 
 
2.1 Preference and matching 
 
 
In the literature on trust distinctions are made between different kinds of trust, 
particularly between competence trust and intentional trust (see Nooteboom 2002). Intentional 
trust refers, in particular, to (presumed) absence of opportunism. That is the focus of TCE and 
also of the present article. We focus on the risk that a partner will defect and thereby cause 
switching costs. In our model trust is interpreted as a subjective probability that expectations 
will be fulfilled (Gambetta 1988), which here entails realization of potential profit. Thus, 
expected profit (E) would be: E = profitability.trust. In the model, agents are assumed to have 
differential preferences for different potential partners (cf. Weisbuch et al., 2000), on the basis 
of a generalized preference score: 
 ii ijijij
αα −⋅= 1trustityprofitabilscore ,     (1)  
where: scoreij is the score i assigns to j, profitabilityij is the profit i can potentially make 
‘through’ j, trustij is i's trust in j and αi ∈ [0, 1] is the weight i attaches to profitability relative 
to trust, i.e. the ‘profit-elasticity’ of the scores that i assigns; i may adapt the value of αi from 
each timestep to the next.  
 At each time step, all buyers and suppliers establish a strict preference ranking over 
all their alternatives. Random draws are used to settle the ranking of alternatives with equal 
scores. The matching of partners is modeled as follows. On the basis of preferences buyers 
are assigned to suppliers or to themselves, respectively. When a buyer is assigned to himself 
this means that he makes rather than buys. In addition to a preference ranking, each agent has 
a ‘minimum tolerance level’ that determines which partners are acceptable. Each agent also 
has a quota for a maximum number of matches it can be involved in at any one time.             
A buyer’s minimum acceptance level of suppliers is the score that the buyer would attach to 
himself. Since it is reasonable that he completely trusts himself, trust is set at its maximum of 
1, and the role of trust in the score is ignored: α = 1. The algorithm used for matching is a 
modification of Tesfatsion's (1997) deferred choice and refusal (DCR) algorithm and it 
proceeds in a finite number of steps, as follows: 
  
1. Each buyer sends a maximum of oi requests to its most preferred, acceptable suppliers. 
Because the buyers typically have different preference rankings, the various suppliers will 
receive different numbers of requests. 
2. Each supplier ‘provisionally accepts’ a maximum of aj requests from its most preferred 
buyers and rejects the rest (if any). 
3. Each buyer that was rejected in any step fills its quota oi in the next step by sending 
requests to next most preferred, acceptable suppliers that it has not yet sent a request to.   
4. Each supplier again provisionally accepts the requests from up to a maximum of aj most 
preferred buyers from among newly received and previously provisionally accepted 
requests and rejects the rest.  As long as one or more buyers have been rejected, the 
algorithm goes back to step 3. 
 
The algorithm stops if no buyer sends a request that is rejected. All provisionally accepted 
requests are then definitely accepted. 
 
  
 
2.2 Trust and trustworthiness 
 
 
Trust, taken as inferred absence of opportunism, is modelled on the basis of observed absence 
of defection.  Following Gulati (1995), we assume that trust increases with the duration of a 
relation. As a relation lasts longer, one starts to take the partner's behavior for granted, and to 
assume the same behavior (i.e. commitment, rather than breaking the relation) for the future. 
An agent i's trust in another agent j depends on what that trust was at the start of their current 
relation and on the past duration of their current relation:  
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where  jit = agent i's trust in agent j, 
j
itt ,ini = agent i's initial trust in agent j, 
x = the past duration of the current relation between agents i and j, and 
f = trustFactor. 
 
This function is taken simply because it yields a curve that increases with decreasing 
returns, as a function of duration x, with 100% trust as the limit, and the speed of increase 
determined by the parameter f.   
In addition, there is a base level of trust, which reflects an institutional feature of a 
society. It may be associated with the expected proportion of non-opportunistic people, or as 
some standard of elementary loyalty that is assumed to prevail. If an agent j, involved in a 
relation with an agent i, breaks their relation, then this is interpreted as opportunistic behavior 
and i’s trust in j decreases; in effect, i's trust drops by a percentage of the distance between the 
current level and the base level of trust; it stays there as i's new initial trust in j, j itt ,ini until the 
next time i and j are matched, after which is starts to increase again for as long as the relation 
lasts without interruption.  
The other side of the coin is, of course, one’s own trustworthiness. This is modelled as 
a threshold τ for defection. One defects only if the advantage over one’s current partner 
exceeds that threshold. It reflects that trustworthiness has its limits, and that trust should 
recognize this and not become blind (Pettit 1995, Nooteboom 2002). The threshold is 
adaptive, as a function of realized profit.  
 
 
2.3 Costs and profits 
 
In sum, the way profits are made is that buyers may increase returns by selling more 
differentiated products, and suppliers may reduce costs by generating production efficiencies.  
There are two sources of production efficiency: economy of scale from a supplier 
producing for multiple buyers, and learning by cooperation in ongoing production relations. 
Economy of scale can be reaped only in production with general-purpose assets, and learning 
by cooperation only in production that is specific for a given buyer, with buyer-specific 
assets. This yields a link with the fundamental concept, in TCE, of ‘transaction specific 
investments’. We assume a connection between the differentiation of a buyer’s product and 
the specificity of the assets required to produce it. In fact, we assume that the percentage of 
  
specific products is equal to the percentage of dedicated assets. This is expressed in a variable 
di ∈ [0, 1]. It determines both the profit the buyer will make when selling his products and the 
degree to which assets are specific, which determines opportunities for economy of scale and 
learning by cooperation. Economy of scale is achieved when a supplier produces for multiple 
buyers. To the extent that assets are specific, for differentiated products, they cannot be used 
for production for other buyers. To the extent that products are general purpose, i.e. 
production is not differentiated, assets can be switched to produce for other buyers. In sum, 
economy of scale, in production for multiple buyers, can only be achieved for the non-
differentiated, non-specific part of production, and economy by learning by cooperation can 
only be achieved for the other, specific part.  
Both the scale and learning effects are modelled as follows: 
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where 
for the scale effect, f=scaleFactor, x is general-purpose assets of supplier j summed over all 
his buyers and scale efficiency jsey ,= ; 
for the learning effect, f=learnFactor; x is the number of consecutive matches between 
supplier j and buyer i and learning efficiency i jley ,= .   
Function (3) expresses decreasing returns for both scale and experience effects. For 
the scale effect, it shows positive values along the vertical axis only for more than 1 general-
purpose asset. This specifies that a supplier can be more scale-efficient than a buyer 
producing for himself only if the scale at which he produces is larger than the maximum scale 
at which a buyer might produce for himself. For the learning effect, a supplier’s 
buyer-specific efficiency is 0 in their first transaction, and only starts to increase if the number 
of transactions is larger than 1. If a relation breaks, the supplier’s efficiency due to his 
experience with the buyer drops to zero. 
All this results in the following specification of profit. The number of general-purpose 
assets that a supplier j needs in order to produce for a buyer i, is equal to )1)(1( , jsi ed −− . The 
number of buyer-specific assets that a supplier j needs, to produce for a buyer i, is equal to 
)1( ,
i
jli ed − . Thus, the profit that can potentially be made in a transaction between a buyer i 
and a supplier j is: 
))1)(1()1(()1( ,, jsi
i
jlii
i
j
j
i ededdpp −−+−−+=+ .   (4) 
 
The first part of (4) specifies returns and the second part specifies costs. It is assumed that the 
agents involved share the profit equally. In other words, we allow for defection but not for the 
threat of defection with the purpose of increasing one’s share in jointly produced added value. 
 
 
2.4 Adaptation 
 
An agent is adaptive if ‘the actions of the agent in its environment can be assigned a 
value (performance, utility, or the like); and the agent behaves in such a way as to improve 
this value over time’ (Holland and Miller 1991: 365). In this model, agents adapt the values 
for α ∈ [0, 1] (weight attached to profit relative to trust) and τ [0, 0.5] (threshold of defection) 
from one time step to the next, which may lead to changes in the scores they assign to 
different agents. Here, adaptation takes place on the basis of past, realized profit. While τ  
  
could conceivably rise up to 1, a maximum of 0.5 was set because initial simulations showed 
that otherwise relations would get locked into initial situations, with little switching. Note that 
this biases the model in favour of opportunism.    
At each time step, each agent assigns a ‘strength’ to each possible value of α and τ. 
This expresses the agent’s confidence in the success of using that particular value. The 
various strengths always add up to constants Cα and Cτ, respectively. At the start of each 
timestep, the selection of values for α and τ is stochastic, with selection probabilities equal to 
relative strengths, i.e. strengths divided by Cα and Cτ, respectively. The strengths of the values 
that were chosen for α and τ at the start of a particular timestep are updated at the end of that 
timestep, on the basis of the agent's performance during that timestep, in terms of realized 
profit: the agent adds the profit obtained during the timestep to the strengths of the values that 
were used for α or τ. After this, all strengths are renormalized to sum to Cα and Cτ again 
(Arthur 1993). The idea is that the strength of values that have led to high performance 
(profit) increases, yielding a higher probability that those values will be selected again. This is 
a simple model of ‘reinforcement learning’ (Arthur 1991, Arthur 1993, Kirman and Vriend 
2000, Lane 1993).  
 
 
 
2.5 The algorithm 
 
 
The algorithm of the simulation is presented by the flowchart in Fig.1. This figure 
shows how the main loop is executed in a sequence of discrete time steps, called a ‘run’. Each 
simulation may be repeated several times as multiple runs, to even out the influence of 
random draws in the adaptation process. At the beginning of a simulation, starting values are 
set for certain model parameters. The user is prompted to supply the number of buyers and 
suppliers, as well as the number of runs, and the number of timesteps in each run. At the start 
of each run, all agents are initialized, e.g. with starting values for trust, and selection 
probabilities for α and τ. In each timestep, before the matching, each agent chooses values for 
α and τ, calculates scores and sets preferences. Then the matching algorithm is applied. In the 
matching, agents may start a relation, continue a relation and break a relation. A relation is 
broken if, during the matching, a buyer does not send any more requests to the supplier, or he 
does, but the supplier rejects them. 
After the matching, suppliers that are matched to buyers produce and deliver for their 
buyers, while suppliers that are not matched do nothing. Buyers that are not matched to 
suppliers produce for themselves (‘self-matched’, in ‘make’ rather than ‘buy’). Afterward, all 
buyers sell their products on the final-goods market. Profit is shared equally with their 
supplier, if they have one. Finally, all agents use that profit to update their preference rankings 
(via α and τ), used as input for the matching algorithm in the next timestep. Across timesteps 
realized profits are accumulated for all buyers and suppliers, and all the relevant parameters 
are tracked.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 1. Flowchart of the simulation. 
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3. Experiments 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
 
The goal of the experiments is to test the following hypotheses.  
While according to TCE maximum efficiency can be achieved, we expect: 
Hypothesis 1: due to complexities of interaction maximum efficiency can rarely be attained.  
According to TCE, high asset specificity leads to more make rather than buy. We 
expect the same result in our extended framework, according to the same 
argumentation.  
Hypothesis 2:  When trust is low, higher asset specificity/differentiated products yields less 
outsourcing.  
In agreement with TCE we expect: 
Hypothesis 3: The more trust, the more collaboration in ‘buy’, rather than ‘make’. 
More specifically: 
Hypothesis 3a: The lower the weight attached to profit relative to trust (α), the more 
collaboration (buy rather than make), and the more loyalty (less switching). 
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the threshold of defection (τ), the more collaboration (buy rather 
than make), and the more loyalty (less switching). 
  
Counter to TCE we expect: 
Hypothesis 4: Even in markets, where profit guides adaptation, high trust (low α; high τ) may 
be sustainable. 
Recall that if during the matching between buyers and suppliers a buyer decides to 
‘buy’ rather than ‘make’, he can follow two different strategies. One is an opportunistic scale 
strategy, where the buyer seeks a profit increase on the basis of economy of scale, by trying to 
find a supplier who serves more than one buyer. This entails much switching and less 
emphasis on loyalty and trust. The other strategy is the learning by cooperation strategy, 
seeking an increase of profit in ongoing relations. This entails less switching and more 
emphasis on loyalty and trust. Thus, in manipulating the strength of the scale effect relative to 
the effect of learning by cooperation, we can bias the model towards opportunism or loyalty. 
This interacts with the degree of asset specificity/specialization, since economy of scale 
applies only to general purpose assets, and learning by cooperation only to specific assets. 
Note that there is an overall bias towards the opportunistic scale strategy, in that economy of 
scale is immediate, thus yielding a more immediate return in profits, while learning by 
cooperation takes time to build up. Thus, we are stacking the odds in favour of the TCE 
theory that we criticize. However, this does seem to be a realistic feature, supporting the 
intuition that trust is more viable in a long-term perspective.  
 
3.2 Model parameters 
 
Each simulation run involves 12 buyers and 12 suppliers and continues for 100 
timesteps. In order to reduce the influence of random draws, each run is repeated 25 times and 
results are averaged across all runs. Initially, results are also averaged for the two classes of 
agents: buyers and suppliers, in order to explore systematic effects. Each buyer's offer quota 
was fixed at 1, and each supplier's acceptance quota was set to 3. In previous experiments 
with each supplier j's acceptance quota set to the total number of buyers, the system quickly 
settled in a state where all buyers buy from a single supplier. For this reason, suppliers were 
only allowed to have a maximum of three buyers. This limits the extent of the scale 
economies that suppliers can reach. A maximum number of buyers may be associated with 
competition policy setting a maximum to any supplier’s market share.  
To test Hypothesis 1, we analyse outcomes in terms of cumulative profit, to see to 
what extent maximum attainable profits are in fact realized, and how this varies across runs of 
the model. To test Hypothesis 2, we consider different values for the percentage of specific 
assets/differentiated products: d = 25, 45, and 65%. In addition, to test Hypotheses 3 and 4, 
we vary initial trust in the range 10, 50 and 90%, initial threshold for defection (τ) from 0 to 
0.5, initial weight attached to profit relative to trust (α) from 0.0 to 1.0.  
We present and discuss averages, across runs as well as agents (all buyers, all 
suppliers), as an indication of overall results. We present the results in the order of different 
starting values of trust. This reflects different institutional settings, from high to low trust 
‘societies’. Here, we can see to what extent those are stable or shift. In particular, the question 
is whether high initial trust can be sustained (Hypothesis 3), and whether perhaps distrust can 
evolve into trust.  
 
3.3 High initial trust 
 
First, we consider an initial situation of high, 90% trust across all agents. This reflects 
a society with a general assumption of high trustworthiness. First, we take intermediate initial 
expected values for α (0.5) and τ (0.25). Next to the variation of degree of specificity            
  
(d = 0.25, 0.45, 0.65), we vary the strength of economy of scale (scale factor sf) and learning 
by cooperation (lf), as follows:  
- both medium strength (lf = sf = 0.5) 
- high learning (lf = 0.9), medium scale (sf = 0.5). This is expected to favour a learning 
by cooperation strategy, with high loyalty 
- medium learning by cooperation (lf = 0.5), high scale (sf = 0.9). This is expected to 
favour a scale strategy, with less loyalty.   
The results are given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for different learn and scale factors 
Buyers max. normal. Profit  
d 
#S.per 
buyer l.f.=0.5;s.f.=0.5 l.f.=0.9;s.f.=0.5 l.f.=0.5;s.f.=0.9 l.f.=0.9;s.f.=0.9
0.65 1 0.98 0.994 0.978 0.99 
0.45 1 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.90 
0.25 1 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.78 
 High initial trust is sustained, and in fact increases from 0.9 to the maximum of 1.0 
 
Table 2 supplies maximum normalized profit actually achieved in the course of time. 
It is obtained by dividing the buyers’ profits by the maximum attainable (theoretical) profit 
they can potentially make in each experiment, which depends on differentiation, and on learn 
and scale factors. Maximum attainable profit is the profit a buyer makes when he has an 
infinite relation with a supplier who produces to an infinite number of buyers. The latter 
factor is limited because suppliers’ acceptance quota is set to 3. Usually maximum actual 
profit is achieved at the last steps of simulation because of adaptation processes in relations 
between buyers and suppliers. At the start point the normalized profit is about 52% for high d 
and 61% for low d.  
Table 2 shows that buyers perform better for high d then for low d. This is partly built-
in: differentiated products are assumed to give higher profit margins. The outcome also results 
from the effect of economy of scale for general purpose (non-specific assets) and learning by 
cooperation for specific assets.  Maximum scale effect is achieved when d is low. Here, the 
maximum arises in a situation where which 12 buyers together buy from only 4 suppliers 
(each, i.e. one third of all suppliers producing for the maximum of three buyers). Because the 
optimal network configuration, where suppliers produce for 3 buyers, emerges rarely, buyers 
organize closer to the optimum when d is higher. Maximum profit is approached more closely 
when products are more differentiated, because then buyers are less sensitive to the optimal 
configuration of network between agents. Then, a buyer has less scope for increased 
efficiency by getting into an arrangement of one supplier producing for him as well as two 
other buyers.  
Now we turn to the hypotheses. Maximum actual profit never achieves maximum 
attainable profit, which confirms Hypothesis 1. The high levels of initial trust are sustained, 
and in fact increase, on average, from 0.9 to the maximum of 1.0, which confirms   
Hypothesis 3. Other results, not specified in the table, show that here there is maximum 
outsourcing: each buyer has a supplier, even at high levels of asset specificity (d=0.65). This 
  
is in agreement with Hypothesis 2. At high levels of trust, outsourcing takes place even at 
high levels of asset specificity.  For all levels of asset specificity (d), in each run at least one 
supplier produced for the maximum of 3 buyers, on average across runs 10% of suppliers did 
this, 15% of suppliers produced for 2 buyers, 40% for 1 buyer, and 35% for 0 buyers. The 
results indicate that in this high-trust society buyers follow the strategy of learning by 
cooperation and loyalty for all d, without switching between suppliers, even for the low value 
d=0.25, where only 25% of assets are subject to learning by cooperation.  
So far, we assumed intermediate levels for the initial weight attached to profit (α) and 
for the threshold of defection (τ). Now we analyze the effects of varying those values: α = 0.0 
and 1.0; τ = 0.0 and 0.5. Learn and scale factors are fixed at the average level, i.e. 0.5. The 
purpose of this experiment is to explore the effects on outsourcing and profit of initial values 
of focus on profit and threshold of defection. According to hypotheses 3a and 3b, a low value 
for α and a high value for τ would favour a trust strategy of durable collaboration and loyalty, 
but the net effects are difficult to judge a priori. A high threshold of defection would tend to 
favour outsourcing and stable relations, particularly when initial trust is also high, provided 
such relations are profitable. However, a high weight attached to profit may prevent 
outsourcing, whereby effects of loyalty do not get a chance to arise. Here, we use the power 
of the ACE methodology to explore outcomes of processes that are too complex to compute 
analytically. The results are given in Table 3. Here, we also supply the average number of 
suppliers per buyer, as an indicator of the extent of outsourcing. 
 
 
   Table 3. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for different α and τ 
Buyers max. norm. Profit & #Suppl. per buyer  
d α=0.0; τ=0.0 α=0.0; τ=0.5 α=1.0; τ=0.0 α=1.0; τ=0.5 
0.65 0.96 1 0.99 1 0.96 0 0.99 0.3 
0.45 0.91 1 0.91 1 0.85 0 0.92 0.4 
0.25 0.80 1 0.80 1 0.82 0.5 0.84 0.6 
 
When α=0, agents put their emphasis on trust and follow the strategy of learning by 
cooperation for all d. The distribution of suppliers between buyers in this case is the same as 
before (Table 2). Each buyer has ongoing transactions with the same supplier but when 
loyalty is equal to zero (τ=0) buyers sometimes break relations with suppliers for high d 
because then profit doesn’t exceed the level of when they make. These buyers try to switch to 
other suppliers but they don’t succeed because all agents are concentrated on trust built up in 
the past of their current relation. Opportunistic buyers then return to their initial partners and 
as a result they lose in profit slightly, for high d, because of switching costs. If loyalty is high 
(τ=0.5) there is no switching for any level of d, and agents try to generate as much profit as 
possible in stable relations by using the advantage of loyalty and trust, in learning by 
cooperation. 
When α=1, agents focus on profitability rather than on trust, and buyers follow two 
strategies simultaneously: some of them buy from suppliers and others make themselves. 
If  τ=0.0 approximately half of buyers have suppliers for d=0.25 and these buyers follow the 
scale strategy, seeking a supplier who already serves two buyers, and trying to match with 
him. As a result, in this case 17% of all suppliers produce for three buyers. For d=0.45 and 
d=0.65 buyers prefer to make themselves, mostly because outsourcing is only preferred as 
relations with suppliers last longer and generate economies of learning, but this is unlikely to 
  
happen at zero loyalty. However, because of high initial trust buyers try to reach suppliers 
sometimes and then lose profit a little because of switching costs. If τ=0.5 the proportion of 
buyers who have suppliers increases for all d: 60% of buyers have suppliers for d=0.25,    
40% for d=0.45 and 30% for d=0.65. However, the distribution of suppliers over buyers is 
different for all d. When d=0.25 approximately 20% of suppliers produce for three buyers and 
therefore profit is higher than in the case with τ=0.0. When d=0.45 about 12% of suppliers 
produce for three buyers and 5% of suppliers produce for one buyer and when d=0.65 
suppliers produce only for one buyer and it is about 30% of them. Therefore for low and 
average d more buyers follow the scale strategy because high loyalty allows them to keep 
stable relations with matched suppliers and generate higher profit than in the case with zero 
loyalty. For high d one part of buyers (70%) produce themselves and other part (30%) follow 
the strategy learning by cooperation because economies of learning are more important than 
scale effect.  
 In sum, overall the results confirm hypotheses 3a and 3b, but there are complicated 
interaction effects that can be calculated only by simulation. Counter to hypothesis 3a, a high 
weight attached to profitability relative to trust (α) does not always favour opportunism. Once 
a buyer accumulates efficiency by learning by cooperation, an emphasis on profit also favours 
loyalty, not to lose the benefit of learning by cooperation. 
 
 
 
3.4 Average and low initial trust 
 
Now we turn to ‘societies’ with a lower, average level of initial trust: X = 0.5. Learn and scale 
factors are again fixed at the average level, i.e. 0.5. The main outcome here is that buyers 
make for high and average levels of specific assets (d), and buy only for low levels. This 
confirms Hypothesis 2. The results are specified in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for average initial trust 
d #Suppl. Per buyer Buyers max. normal. Profit 
0.65 0 0.99 trust remains at 0.5 
0.45 0 0.87 trust remains at 0.5 
0.25 1 0.80 trust increases to 1.0 
 
At first sight, it may seem counter-intuitive that trust increases from an average to the 
highest level under low specific assets (d = 0.25), since then the effect of learning by 
cooperation is lowest, so that the rewards of a trust strategy seem lowest. The explanation is 
as follows. Under average trust, suppliers are more attractive than buyers consider themselves 
only for low d, because potential losses in a case of switching are smaller for low d than for 
high d. For high levels of specificity, buyers never enter into relations with outside suppliers, 
and thus never profit from collaboration and forego opportunities for the build-up of trust.  
Compared with the corresponding case in the high trust world (first column, Table 2), 
normalized profits are the same for high and low values of d, but lower for intermediate 
values. The network configuration of suppliers and buyers for low d is the same as in the case 
of high initial trust: 10% of suppliers produce for 3 buyers, 15% of suppliers produce for 2 
buyers, 40 % for 1 buyer, 35% for 0 buyers. Buyers follow the learning by cooperation 
strategy in ongoing relations without switching.  
  
In the case of low initial trust, i.e. X=0.1, buyers produce themselves (have no 
suppliers) even for a low level of specific assets. This again confirms hypothesis 2. The 
results are specified in Table 5. The result is a drop of normalized profits for low d, compared 
to the medium and high trust cases. All opportunities for learning by cooperation in 
collaboration are foregone.  
 
Table 5. Buyers’ maximum normalized profits for low initial trust 
d #Suppl. Per buyer Buyers max. normal. Profit 
0.65 0 0.99   trust remains at 0.1 
0.45 0 0.87   trust remains at 0.1 
0.25 0 0.63   trust remains at 0.1 
 
 Overall, the results show that under high trust (Table 2, column 1) maximum realized 
normalized profit is higher than under low trust (Tables 4 and 5) for intermediate and low 
levels of asset specificity (0.91 and 0.80 vs. 0.87 and 0.63), and marginally lower for high 
asset specificity (0.98 vs. 0.99). Overall, this confirms the central hypothesis 4 that trust can 
well be viable in markets.   
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 
The overall outcome is that in interactions between agents maximum efficiency is 
seldom achieved and that both trust and opportunism can be profitable, but they go for 
different strategies. This suggests that there may be different societies, going for different 
strategies, of switching or of loyalty, which settle down in their own self-sustaining systems.  
High initial trust dictates buy relative to make for all levels of specific investments. 
For high specific investments, buyers’ maximum profit is almost the same as in the cases of 
average or low initial trust. Low initial trust imposes make relative to buy, but buyers’ 
maximum profits for low specific investments are smaller than in the case of high initial trust. 
Overall, across all parameter settings, profit tends to be higher under high than under low 
trust.  
In addition to the expected results, incorporated in the hypotheses, the model yields a 
few unanticipated results. One is that buyers organize closer to maximum possible efficiency 
for high levels of specific investments. The reason is that for low levels of specific 
investments there is more scope for scale effects, but this is difficult to attain by having 
suppliers supply to the maximum number of buyers. A strong effect of learning by 
cooperation, a high weight attached to trust, and high loyalty favour the learning by 
cooperation strategy for high levels of specific investments, while a high weight attached to 
profit and high loyalty favour the scale strategy for low and average levels of specific 
investments. Finally, it is not always the case that a high weight attached to profitability 
relative to trust does not always favour opportunism. Once a buyer begins to profit from 
learning by cooperation, an emphasis on profit may also lead to loyalty, in an ongoing 
relationship.  
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